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EXECUTIVE ORDER 13303: IS THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
CHOOSING CORPORATIONS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIONS
INSTITUTED VIA THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT?
Rod Khavari*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, along with the combined efforts of the United Kingdom
and several other nations, invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003.1 On December 14,
2003, the United States achieved a military victory, successfully ousting the
government of Saddam Hussein. 2 Although the U.S. and the U.K. claim to have
acted in accordance with international law, many thought otherwise.3 Thus far,
the U.S. armed forces' occupation has encountered increased resistance, while
subsequently there is growing controversy over the continued presence in Iraq.
4
Among the controversy is Executive Order 13303 (E.O. 13303), signed by
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like to dedicate this comment to my parents, Reza and Fatima Khavari, for their incredible support
and encouragement. I would also like to recognize the dedicated Editorial Board and staff of the
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law for their feedback and support in preparing
this comment for publication.
1. The White House, President Bush Addresses the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
2. The White House, President Bush Addresses Nation on the Capture of Saddam Hussein,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
3. See Global Policy Forum, Iraq, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/irqindx.htm
(last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
4. Id.
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President Bush on May 22, 2003.5 In short, the order is designed to immunize
U.S. corporations for any activity, including environmental damage and even
human rights, undertaken while operating in Iraq. 6 E.O. 13303 prevents lawsuits
to be brought by U.S. citizens against these corporations, and also precludes
foreign citizens from invoking the Alien Tort Claims Act.
7
Black's Law Dictionary defines an Executive Order (E.O.) as "[a]n order
issued by or on behalf of the President, usu. intended to direct or instruct the
actions of executive agencies or government officials, or to set policies for the
executive branch to follow." 8  "Executive orders are official documents,
numbered consecutively," which appear in the daily Federal Register as they are
signed by the President and received by the Federal Register. 9 Executive orders
have been issued by various Presidents of the United States since the time of
George Washington.' 0  Although no Constitutional provision or statute
specifically grants the President this power, I Article II, section 1 of the United
States Constitution provides, "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." Furthermore, Article II, section 3
states that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed. . . ." 13 The President issues executive orders as a means to help
executive officers direct their operation.14  Although having no legal force,
failure to comply with an order may result in dismissal from office. 15 In some
5. EarthRights International, Outrageous Bush Executive Order on Iraq Oil Must be
Investigated (July 28, 2003),
http://www.earthrights.org/campaignfeature/bush executiveorder_13303-on iraq oilmustbei
nvestigated.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2006) (EarthRights International is a nonprofit,
nongovernmental organization, combining the power of law and individuals to defend human
rights and the environment).
6. See Exec. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 227-29 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86-
87 (2000).
7. Anthony J. Sebok and Claire R. Kelly, Does a Presidential Iraq Executive Order Take
Away Tort Victims' Right to Sue? (Nov. 3, 2003),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20031103-kelly.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (8th ed. 2004).
9. Federal Register, FAQ's About Executive Orders, http://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/executive-orders/about.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (The Federal Register is the
official daily compilation of federal regulations and legal notices of Federal agencies and
organizations, as well as Executive Orders and other presidential proclamations).
10. Thisnation.com, What is an Executive Order?,
http://www.thisnation.com/question/040.htn (last visited Dec. 28, 2006).
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
14. What is an Executive Order?, supra note 10.
15. Id.
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cases, when executive orders are made pursuant to certain Acts of Congress, they
may have the force of law and thus provide the President with discretionary
16power.
Historically, until the early 1900s, executive orders were mostly
unannounced and extended only to the agencies they were directed towards.'
7
Additionally, a poor record keeping system and decay arising from the aged
documents led to the State Department developing a numbering system. 18 Until
the early 1950s, Presidents had carte blanche to do what they pleased with regard
to Executive Orders, as there were no rules or guidelines specifically outlining
the Presidential powers concerning executive orders.' 9 This was changed by the
Supreme Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, which determined
that President Truman's order to place all steel mills in the country under federal
control was an invalid exercise of the presidential power under the constitutional
provisions granting executive power. The Supreme Court held the President
had overstepped his boundaries in attempting to make law, rather than clarify a• • 22
law already put forth by Congress or the Constitution. In a similar case,23
Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Supreme Court established that "the Executive
may settle its nationals' claims based upon its inherent powers and the implicit
consent of Congress, by effectuating a 'change in law' so that an alternative
forum can resolve these claims."'24  The decisions of Presidents Truman and
Reagan have led subsequent presidents to exercise greater caution when citing
laws relied upon to issue the executive orders.25 However, the power to issue
executive orders still remains under heavy criticism.26  Critics argue that
16. Id,
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
21. Robert Higgs, Truman's Attempt to Seize the Steel Industry, THE FREEMAN, (Mar. 1, 2004),
http://www.fee.org/pdf/the-freeman/higgs03O4.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2005).
22. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. 579.
23. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
24. Claire R. Kelly, The War on Jurisdiction: Troubling Questions About Executive Order
13303, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 483, 494 (2004) (describing how Executive Orders may be utilized by the
President in times of emergency).
25. The Impact of Executive Orders on the Legislative Process: Executive Lawmaking?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Legislative and Budget Process of the H. Comm. on Rules,
106th Cong. (1999) available at http://rules.house.gov/archives/rulesolsoO8.htm (last visited Dec.
22, 2006) (statement of William Olson, President, William Olson P.C.),
26. See generally CATO Institute, Executive Orders and National Emergencies: How
Presidents Have Come to "Run the Country" by Usurping Legislative Power,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-358es.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2006).
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Presidents use Executive Orders not to enforce law, but to create law, moving
existing laws away from their original mandates.
27
The purpose of this comment is to provide an analysis of the Bush
Administration's intentions by the passage of E.O. 13303 and whether it is an
attempt to bar suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act (A.T.C.A.). Section II
provides an in-depth analysis of E.O. 13303 and raises unsettling implications.
Issues that will examined in this section include whether E.O. 13303 attempts to
grant total immunity to companies assisting in the Iraq reconstruction process
and how it would be evaluated if challenged. Section III provides an
introduction of the A.T.C.A. and its development since 1979 from law to the
basis for victims of human rights abuses to sue. Section III also analyses whether
the Bush Administration is revoking the rights of victims of human rights abuses
by the passage of E.O. 13303. Section IV briefly looks to legal precedents
which provided a two-steps-analysis that courts derived when determining the
validity of an executive order. Finally, Section V first provides an analysis of
the most recent Supreme Court decision where the jurisdiction of the A.T.C.A.
was at issue, and predicts the decision's effect on E.O. 13303.
II. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13303
The War on Terror taking place in Iraq has attracted a significant amount of
attention, but one of the most controversial Executive Orders has almost been
overlooked. 2 8  Its implications were originally unnoticed, 29 but E.O. 13303
"arguably challenges our notion of separation of powers, due process and access
,30
to the courts." Specifically, President Bush passed E.O. 13303 on May 22,
2003 with the aim of "[p]rotecting the Development Fund for Iraq and Certain
Other Property in Which Iraq Has An Interest.'
The scope of protection provided by the E.O. is only "limited only by the
imagination. ' '32 This is expressed by its introductory statement of Section 1,
which states that "any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution,
garnishment, or other judicial process is prohibited, and shall be deemed null and
27. Id.
28. Kelly, supra note 24, at 484.
29. Andr6 Verloy, Oil Immunity?, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, Oct. 30, 2003, available
at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=69 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
30. Kelly, supra note 24, at 483.
31. Exec. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 227 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86 (2000).
32. Memorandum from Tom Devine, Government Accountability Project legal director, to
Sustainable Energy and Economy Network (July 18, 2003), available at
http://www.seen.org/GAPEO.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Government
Accountability Project].
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void .... 33 In terms of coverage, E.O. 13303 was written broadly to confer
protection upon a wide range of profits or items of value, petroleum products,
legal documents, financial interests, and contracts. 34It seems as if E.O. 13303
was not issued as an attempt to "block transfers of property generally, but only
the use of judicial process to transfer such property."3 5 Thus, the overall goal of
E.O. 13303 appears to be an ultimate protection of Iraqi "property from lawsuits,
thereby immunizing private companies. ' 36  Furthermore, the Executive Order
protects "the U.S. government from... liability for the acts of the U.S.
military."37 Clearly, E.O. 13303 removes the ability to enforce international law
and any civil or criminal liability with respect to protected activities for
associations or corporations immune by the Executive Order.38  Thus, E.O.
13303 raises troubling implications.
39
Executive Order 13303 has led to increased controversy over what has
come as a result of its issuance and the purpose of our presence in Iraq. First,
in order for potential plaintiffs to attempt to establish liability against any
corporation immunized under the E.O. 13303, they must "obtain[] permission in
the form of a license" from the Department of Treasury.4 1 However, whether the
government grants permission via this required license for plaintiffs attempting
to establish liability is irrelevant; 42 this attempt to immunize corporations
otherwise liable not only lacks congressional consent, but also leaves plaintiffs
without an alternative forum.4 3 Thus far, history has yet to provide the authority
or precedent for such actions. 44 Arguably, the failure to provide an alternative
forum raises questions of whether a taking of this magnitude is constitutional,
33. 3 C.F.R. 228, reprinted in § 1701, at 86.
34. Kelly, supra note 24, at 492.
35. Id. at 489-90.
36. Id. at 490.
37. James Thuo Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights Upon Conquest and Under
Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 491, 548
(2004).
38. Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
39. See Kelly, supra note 24, at 486.
40. See id. at 487.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Compare Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (noting the establishment of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal as an alternative forum for litigants with claims against the government
of Iran) with Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (allowing for the settlement of
claims against private companies and noting the establishment of an alternative forum for
Holocaust claims).
44. Kelly, supra note 24, at 487.
20061
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whether federal jurisdiction has been withdrawn or modified, and whether this
failure to provide a forum improperly immunizes companies.
45
A. Analysis of the Order
Executive Order 13303 can be read as immunizing everything associated
with the sales and marketing of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.
46
Specifically, Section 1(b) protects "all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products,
and interests therein.., of any nature whatsoever arising from or related to the
sale or marketing thereof, and interests therein ... . This "means all
corporate activities with roots or any connection to Iraqi" petroleum or
petroleum products are covered. Such corporate activities include petroleum
"extraction... transportation, manufactur[ing], customer service, corporate
records and payment of taxes." 4 9 Not only is petroleum protected, but is all
downstream "commerce such as plastics in the petrochemical industry," or any
other development which includes the use of Iraqi oil.
50
With the passage of E.O. 13303, employees injured by corporations
operating in violation of environmental or human rights laws will no longer have
legal recourse. 51  Furthermore, not only are employees of transnational
corporations injured and left without legal redress, but so is any future Iraqi
government;5 2 E.O. 13303 eliminates the ability of any future Iraqi government
to sue immune U.S. oil companies operating in Iraq. 53 The passage of E.O.
13303 suggests that the Administration is concerned that lawsuits could
negatively impact U.S. corporations, and because of this concern E.O. 13303
prohibits any future Iraqi government from suing U.S. oil companies for
compensation and damages caused by U.S. corporation presence in Iraq. 54 By
enacting the E.O., the President's intentions seemed to be aimed at
"immuniz[ing] the [Coalition Provisional Authority], private contractors, and
other [parties] engaged in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq from
45. Id.
46. Compare Kelly supra note 24 with Exec. Order No. 13,315, 3 C.F.R. 252-55 (2004),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 88-90 (2000) (blocking all transfers of property of the former
Iraqi regime).
47. Exec. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 228 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86 (2000).
48. Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Barnali Choudhury, Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act: Alternative Approaches to
Attributing Liability to Corporations For Extraterritorial Abuses, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 43, 45
n. 11 (2005).
52. See 3 C.F.R. 227-29, reprinted in § 1701, at 86-87.
53. See id.
54. See id.
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lawsuits [initiated by a variety of torts] committed in Iraq for which liability
would be imposed by U.S. or international law."55  The Administration has
labeled the threat of lawsuits as so extreme that it declared a national emergency
in order to address it.56  E.O. 13303 expressly invokes an "unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United
States ...... 7
As mentioned earlier, E.O. 13303 went unnoticed outside the government
until it was discovered in July 2003 by the Institute for Policy Studies. 58 The
Institute for Policy Studies assists by providing long-term planning and
responding to world events.59 At this point, rumors were raised over whether the
Bush Administration had provided full immunity to U.S. oil companies
operating in Iraq "for the consequences of any of their actions in exploiting the
oil.'6° By the proposal of E.O. 13303, the Bush Administration appears to be
automatically nullifying any claims of breach of contract, labor rights violations,
and payment of taxes owed to Iraq.6 1 Many public interest organizations, such
as the Institute for Policy Studies and Government Accountability Project, urged
Congress to repeal the order as it overreaches the goals of U.N. Resolution
1483. 6 2 According to Tom Devine, legal director of Government Accountability
Project, E.O. 13303 constitutes a "blank check for corporate anarchy [as it]
cancels the concept of corporate accountability and abandons the rule of law."
63
1. The Development Fund of Iraq
The Development Fund of Iraq ("the Fund") was initially administered by
the Coalition Provisional Authority ("C.P.A.").64 The C.P.A. administrator then
requested from the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank of New York to establish the
55. Gathii, supra note 37, at 542.
56. 3 C.F.R. 228, reprinted in § 1701, at 86.
57. Id.
58. Verloy, supra note 29.
59. Institute for Policy Studies Overview, http://www.ips-dc.org/overview.htm (last visited
Dec. 20, 2006).
60. Kenneth Davidson, How Many Americans Will Die For Oil?, THE AGE, Aug. 4, 2003,
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/03/l059849273357.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
61. Sandra T. Vreedenburgh, The Saddam Oil Contracts and What Can Be Done, 2 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 559, 577 (2004).
62. Sustainable Energy & Economy Network, Groups Demand Repeal of Bush Immunity for
U.S. Oil Companies in Iraq (July 23, 2003), http://www.seen.org/BushEO.shtml (last visited Dec.
20, 2005) (The Sustainable Energy & Economy Network works in partnership with citizen groups
globally on human rights issues while placing focus on energy, economic issues, gender equity,
and environmental justice).
63. Vreedenburgh, supra note 61, at 577.
64. See generally Gathii, supra note 37.
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"Central Bank of Iraq-Development Fund for Iraq." 65 The C.P.A. was led by
Paul Bremer, who established a Program Review Board, whose "duty was to be
'responsible for recommending expenditures of resources from the Development
Fund for Iraq."' Representatives of multilateral institutions such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund could attend the board meetings as
nonvoting members. 66  The Fund, which consists mainly of oil revenues, is
expected to finance the reconstruction of Iraq. 67 Taking that into consideration
along with E.O. 13303, the Fund is subject to "watertight protection from any
claims whatsoever, insofar as they relate to claims on oil-related entities.
68
Placing establishment and control of the Fund in hands of U.S. officials
could prove to bear significant implications for the way Iraqi reconstruction
contracts would be distributed among companies involved in the reconstruction
process.69 In fact, Robert Stein, a former official holding a senior position in the
C.P.A., recently "admitted [in a Washington court] to stealing more than $2m
[from reconstruction funds] and taking bribes in return for contracts. Mr. Stein
also received gifts and other benefits from his position.7 1 Reports show that as
of June 2004, more than twenty billion dollars in income had been received into
the Development Fund of Iraq-of which only eleven billion dollars have been
spent, and the remainder is not fully accounted for.7 2  Due to this
unaccountability of expenses, the Iraq Revenue Watch has been setup to account
for the largely secretive and unaccountable expenditures.
7 3
65. The Coalition Provisional Authority, The Development Fund for Iraq, http://www.cpa-
iraq.org/budget/DFIintrol.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) (The C.P.A. is the transitional
government that governed Iraq from April 2003 to June 2004. During its existence, the C.P.A.
assisted in building the foundation for sovereignty which includes security, essential services,
economy, and governance.).
66. L. ELAINE HALCHIN, THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (CPA): ORIGIN,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES CRS-22 - CRS-23 (June 6, 2005), available
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48620.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
67. Id. at CRS-21.
68. V. Shridhar, The Oil Order, FRONTLINE, Aug. 2003, available at
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2017/stories/20030829001405300.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
69. Id.
70. Adam Brookes, US Official Admits Iraq Aid Theft, BBC NEWS, Feb. 2, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/4675902.stm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
71. Id.
72. CNN.com, Audit: U.S. Lost Track of $9 Billion in Iraq Funds, Jan. 31, 2005, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/30/iraq.audit (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
73. See Iraq Revenue Watch: Monitoring Iraq Reconstruction Funds, Contracts, Oil,
http://www.iraqrevenuewatch.org/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
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2. The Role of U.N. Resolution 1483
Just a few hours prior to the issuance of E.O. 13303, the United Nations
Security Council adopted U.N. Resolution 1483, which would subsequently lift
sanctions against Iraq, create a Development Fund for the country, and
simultaneously provide a limited immunity through 2007 for the protection of
oil-generated revenues. 74 The Development Fund for Iraq, housed in the Central
Bank of Iraq, was created in an effort to administer proceeds from the export
sales of Iraq's oil.75  To help clear up the ambiguity, U.N. Resolution 1483
proposed protecting the initial purchase of Iraqi oil from any claims resulting in
attachment until the end of 2007. 76 The plan was to direct profits from future
sales of Iraqi petroleum into the Development Fund, which would later "be
disbursed at the direction of the Authority, in consultation with the interim Iraqi
administration." 77 On the same day the UN Resolution was adopted, President
Bush issued E.O. 13303 in order to give this Resolution the force of U.S. law;
however, E.O. 13303 has no sunset date.78 This explains the need for Section
l(a) of the Order; however, it fails to explain the rationale behind Section l(b),
which is unnecessary if the Executive's sole purpose was to protect the Fund.
79
Key differences between U.N. Resolution 1483 and E.O. 13303 include: the
scope of coverage, time limitations, and the level of protection from sale to
sale.8
0
III. THE A.T.C.A.: THE EVOLUTION FROM LAW To LAWSUITS
The United States' enactment of the Alien Tort Claims Act as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 (A.T.C.A.) 8 1 remained dormant for almost 200 years until
its revival in 1980. 82  Although left untouched for almost 200 years, the
A.T.C.A. plays an important role in promoting compliance "with fundamental
74. U.S. Department of State, UN Security Council Resolution 1483 Lifts Sanctions on Iraq;
International Community Pledges Assistance for People of Iraq (Mar. 22, 2003),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20888.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
75. Id.
76. S.C. Res. 1483, 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
77. Id. at 20, 13.
78. Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn From Each Other, 6 CIi. J. INT'L L.
391,395 (2005).
79. Kelly, supra note 24, at 493.
80. Compare S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) with Exec. Order No.
13,303, 3 C.F.R. 227-29 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86-87 (2000).
81. Lucien J. Dhooge, The Alien Tort Claims Act And The Modem Transnational Enterprise:
Deconstructing The Mythology of Judicial Activism, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 3, 6 (2003).
82. Kenneth J. Rose, The World Gets a Little Smaller; International Employers May Find
Themselves Sued in the U.S. for Egregious Overseas Labor Practices,
http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Sep/27/133590.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
2006]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
treaty-based and customary international law.'83  Since the Second Circuit's
decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980, the A.T.C.A. has allowed citizens of
other countries to sue in U.S. courts for human rights abuses. 84 Other courts,
including the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, have followed the rationale used by
the Second Circuit in Filartiga, subsequentlysproviding victims the ability to
seek civil damages for human rights abuses. Most recently, human rights
supporters awaited one of the last rulings in the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,86 which reaffirmed that the A.T.C.A. is a jurisdictional statute granting
subject matter jurisdiction in a certain narrow class of claims. 87  To many
victims and survivors of human rights abuses, the A.T.C.A. provides the only
chance for justice 88 and a means to help ease the healing process. 89 Plaintiffs
feel empowered and gain strength by being given a chance to tell their stories
and confront their abusers. 90 Over the past twenty-five years, the A.T.C.A. has
allowed foreign victims of international human rights abuses-such as summary
executions, genocide, war crimes, and inhumane treatment-to sue for such
violations of international law. 9 1  The Act, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1350,
provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States."
92
A. Background of the Alien Tort Claims Act
Although the Act has been utilized to prevent human rights abuses,
invoking the Act still remains difficult, absent some controlling exception, since
the traditional immunity granted to foreign states and their leaders remains
83. Jordan J. Paust International Law Before the Supreme Court. A Mixed Record of
Recognition, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 829, 835 (2005).
84. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-90 (2d Cir. 1980) (non-citizens can sue in
United States under the A.T.C.A. for violations of the law of nations).
85. Human Rights First, The Alien Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act:
Important Tools in the Fight Against Impunity,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intemational-justice/w-context/w_cont_12.htm (last visited Dec.
20, 2006).
86. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
87. Id. at 714.
88. See EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, IN OUR COURT: ATCA, SOSA AND THE TRIUMPH OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (July 2004), available at http://www.earthrights.org/files/Reports/inourcourt.pdf
(last visited Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Earthrights International].
89. Michael Ratner, Civil Remedies for Gross Human Rights Violations, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/justicelawbackgroundtorture.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
90. Id.
91. Rose, supra note 82.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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intact.93 However, important advances have been made since the Filartiga case,
notably the expansion of the range of defendants responsible for human rights
abuses as opposed to the actual perpetrator. 94 This was demonstrated in Xuncax
v. Gramajo, where "refugee survivors... sued the general they alleged was
responsible" for genocide crimes.95 Although the defendant did not personally
commit the murders, the court found him liable due to the doctrine of command
responsibility, finding that he had knowledge and initiated the terror campaign.
96
Now, under the A.T.C.A., commanders or generals who authorize the violations
and know or should know of these violations will also be liable. 97 Since its
revival, the A.T.C.A. has also been used as a basis for relief against governments
and private parties.
98
Corporations have been held accountable when involved in extreme
violations of labor practices. 99 Legal scholars suggest the passage of E.O. 13303
was prompted by the increasing number of transnational corporations involved
in A.T.C.A. suits alleging human rights violations.100 There has been a rising
fear that transnational corporations, such as Halliburton, operating in the War on
Terror on Iraqi soil may be sued in U.S. District Courts by foreign citizens
invoking the A.T.C.A. 10 Possibly, E.O. 13303 has finally granted the wish for
tort reform that corporations have been unsuccessful in getting past the Senate
for years. 10 2 Of course, corporations operating in Iraq wish they "could insulate
[themselves] from tort actions in the United States." 10 3  Transnational
corporations and the U.S. government have felt that the A.T.C.A. is an
awakening monster, threatening corporations and their investments as opposed
to being the savior for human rights victims and survivors. 10 Most recently, the
A.T.C.A. has been heavily utilized as a means of relief against transnational
93. Caroline Davidson, Tort Au Canadien: A Proposal For Canadian Tort Legislation on
Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1403, 1415 (2005).
94. Ratner, supra note 89.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Mark Tushnet, TransnationallDomestic Constitutional Law, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 239,246-
47 (2003).
100. Sebok, supra note 7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (2003).
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enterprises for complicity in human rights violations. 105 Cases filed recently
include a claim against the Coca-Cola Company alleging liability for
parliamentary forces that terrorized and murdered union members in
Columbia. 10 6 Another case alleges that Exxon Mobil "aided and abetted civil
rights abuses of Indonesian army by hiring components to guard natural gas
pipeline."' 1 7  With the passage of E.O. 13303, the Bush Administration is
barring A.T.C.A. suits brought by foreign citizens who are injured byK U.S.
transnational corporations' alleged complicity in human rights violations.
B. Elements of the Alien Tort Claims Act
The elements of the A.T.C.A. seem relatively simple at first glance,
requiring an alien plaintiff alleging "a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'1 9 As explicitly written in the
statute, only torts in violation of a U.S. treaty or the law of nations can
110successfully be brought under the A.T.C.A. Courts have demonstrated a
stringent threshold in determining whether the alleged conduct satisfies this
requirement. I1
1. Law of Nations
A violation of the law of nations requires the tort to violate a norm of
customary international law. 112 To determine whether there has been a violation
of the law of nations, the courts examine contemporary international law as
suggested by international conventions, international custom, and "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 113  Moreover, since the
Nuremberg Trials, international law has universally categorized certain crimes as
egregious, thus automatically making those prosecutable offenses. 114 These acts
105. Genevieve Sheehan, Globalizing Law: The ATCA Out of The Attic, 26 HARV. INT'L REV. 6
(2004), available at http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1241/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) [hereinafter
Sheehan].
106. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
107. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005).
108. Peter Weiss, Human Rights Switcheroo, 174 N.J. L.J. 95 (2003) (discussing the Bush
Administration's attack on the A.T.C.A. and its attempt to repeal the Act).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
110. Id.
11. See Dhooge, supra note 81.
112. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
113. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
114. Center for Constitutional Rights, Plain Responses to Attacks on the Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/human-rights/docs/atcaQ&A.pdf (last visited on Dec. 14,
2006) [hereinafter Responses to ATCA].
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115 . 116 117include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, summary
execution, 118 and torture. 119 A high threshold of what constitutes a violation has
been established to prevent courts of any one nation from imposing idiosyncratic
laws on other countries in guise of international law. 12  The theory is that a
broader interpretation of the law of nations poses a greater risk of imposing
American, as opposed to universal, norms on other countries. 12 1 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court's ruling in Sosa assures that frivolous actions will be struck
down, as demonstrated by the dismissal of Alvarez-Machain's claim, in which
the U.S. Supreme Court held Alvarez-Machain's twenty-four hour arrest did not
violate international law.1
22
C. A. T. C.A.: The Objective
Originally, the objective of the A.T.C.A. was to provide recourse for
victims and survivors by bringing former officials and military officers to
justice. 123 The Filartiga case set forth important advances for the A.T.C.A. in
establishing civil liability of those responsible for egregious violations of human
rights. 124 Cases following Filartiga have had an expanded range of defendants
including those who ordered violations and those who knew or should have
known of ongoing violations, yet failed to prevent them from continuing.
125
After having recognized that the A.T.C.A. can apply to both private parties and
governments, fear has arisen for the possibility of claims against transnational
corporations for human rights abuses. 26 That fear has quickly become a reality,
with tort lawsuits aimed at businesses rising a staggering fourteen percent in
2001 and thirteen percent in 2002 after a rise of only three percent the previous
115. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
116. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799 (9th Cir. 1986).
117. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43.
118. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)
(victims of Marcos regime sued for abuses by soldiers and government authorities of the
Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s).
119. Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
120. Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law, Corporate Liability for Violations
of International Human Rights Law, 114 HAR. L. REv. 2025, 2042 (2001) [hereinafter
Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law].
121. Id. at 2042.
122. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699 (2004).
123. Ratner, supra note 89.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Theodore R. Lee & Littler Mendelson, P.C., Global Employment Claims: Emerging
International Labor and Employment Issues, 730 PLI/Lit 681, 712 (2005).
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decade. 127 This growth has not only affected the United States, but seems to be
rising internationally as well.128 Although most of the cases against corporations
have been dismissed, the increase in lawsuits will ultimately affect international
business relationships. 129 Until the recent outpour of lawsuits against potential
corporations, the A.T.C.A. had been well supported by both the Carter and
Clinton Administrations. 130 Furthermore, despite concerns of the impact of the
A.T.C.A., President George H. W. Bush also supported the doctrine by signin
legislation authorizing the expansion of human rights accountability.31
However, the Bush Administration holds a differing view. 132 Prior to the recent
appellate decision of Unocal, the Bush Administration's Justice Department had
several choices. 133 They could have chosen to support the plaintiffs; they could
have stayed neutral towards the issue, or they could have supported the
defendants only in this case. 134 Instead, the Administration formed a radical re-
interpretation of the A.T.C.A., in which it sought reversal of twenty-five years of
legal precedent. 135 The Justice Department took the view that victims of gross
abuse could not sue under the A.T.C.A. because the harm occurred outside of the
United States and the detrimental effects a ruling against a corporation would
have on foreign relations.
136
IV. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT & EXECUTIVE ORDER 13303: THE
BATTLE AGAINST FOREIGN POLICY & THE WAR ON TERROR
The debate surrounding the future of the A.T.C.A. has become increasingly
heated amidst the United States War on Terror and the Bush Administration's
127. Leon Gettler, Liability Forges a New Morality,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2005/O803morality.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
128. See Gettler, supra note 127.
129. Jonathon Huneke, Alien Tort Lawsuits Rest on Shaky Legal Ground, Industry Leader
Asserts (2003), http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentlD=2627 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
130. Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration's Efforts to Limit
Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004).
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Harold Hongju Koh, Wrong on Rights (July 18, 2003),
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2121 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006) (Mr. Koh is a
"Professor of International Law at Yale University and former US Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor." Id.).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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foreign policy objectives. 137  With its attacks on the A.T.C.A., the Bush
Administration is demonstrating a principled legal objective or desire to end
cases against corporations. 138 Opponents of the A.T.C.A. fear that further use of
the 214 year-old law could lead to a decreased presence of American business
abroad and a rise in frivolous lawsuits. 139 Supporters suggest that the A.T.C.A.
is the only means of holding violators, whether corporations or private parties,
responsible for their actions. 14  Without the A.T.C.A., corporate violations of
human rights would go unredressed, as they frequently do as a result of gaps in
domestic and international law regimes.14 ' Furthermore, with an increased
presence of U.S. corporations in Iraq, and in particular U.S. oil corporations,
E.O. 13303 attempts to bar lawsuits invoking the A.T.C.A.
142
A. Attacks on the A. T. C.A.
The opposition of the A.T.C.A. has raised several key issues and invoked
fears concerning its effects on foreign policy. 14 3 The most recent decisions raise
the possibility that American courts may begin to hold U.S. corporations liable
' 44
for human rights violations. Actions brought under the A.T.C.A. against a
corporation are especially important due to the impact a significant judgment• 145
could have on the corporation. Recently, the A.T.C.A. has been under heavy
attack by those opposing the A.T.C.A., claiming its effects on foreign policy
could be drastic. 14 One commentator states, "[i]t empowers aliens and ill-
informed federal judges to confound U.S. foreign policy through decrees that
adjudicate the legality of foreign acts of state under elastic and protean
international law." 4 7 As the founding fathers understood and is reflected in the
Constitution, 14 8 U.S. foreign policy and its international affairs should be
137. See Jim Lobe, Villagers vs. Oil Giant: Ashcroft to The Rescue, ASIAN TIMES, May 17, 2003,
available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/EEl7Ae03.html (last visited Dec. 20,
2006).
138. EarthRights International, supra note 88, at 6.
139. Debating the Tort Claims Act, PBS, Sept. 1, 2006,
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/alientortdebate.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
140. Shaw W. Scott, Taking Riggs Seriously: The ATCA Case Against a Corporate Abettor of
Pinochet Atrocities, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1497, 1543 (2005).
141. Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law, supra note 120.
142. Weiss, supra note 108.
143. See Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law, supra note 120.
144. Id.
145. Igor Fuks, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and The Future of ATCA Litigation: Examining
Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 116 (2006).
146. Marc Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Lawsuit over Alleged Abuses at Myanmar
Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005.
147. Bruce Fein, Foreign Policy Engine Tune-Up, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003.
148. Id.
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represented by a unitary authority, the President. 149 This was further established
by the 1936 Supreme Court case, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation, which held "the President alone has the power to speak or listen as
a representative of the nation .... 150
In an August 2004 response to Doe v. Unocal, 151 the U.S. Department of
Justice (D.O.J.) filed an amicus curiae brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. 152  The D.O.J.'s role is to "enforce the law and defend the
interests of the United States," as well as to ensure public safety against
domestic and foreign threats. 153 In its amicus curiae brief, the D.O.J. contends
that the A.T.C.A. has been "transformed by lower courts from a rarely invoked
statutory provision into a prodigious font of litigation involving efforts by aliens
to bring claims for alleged violations of their human rights in the United States
courts even with respect to events that are entirely extraterritorial .... ,,154 By
lower courts inferring a right of action from the jurisdictional provision of the
Act, federal courts are forced to determine what violations of customary
international law are privately actionable. 155 The Administration contends that
currently, the means of A.T.C.A. litigation allows courts, not the political
branches, "to bring about change in anti-democratic policies and human rights
violations."
15 6
1. United States Public Officials
Misuse of the Act will not only affect U.S. involvement in international
affairs, but it could backfire and come back to haunt U.S. public officials
149. Jake Kreilkamp, Suing Saddam - And Others - In U.S. Courts: The Controversy Over the
Alien Tort Claims Act (July 9, 2003),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer-friendly.pl?page=/student/20030709-kreilkamp.htnil
(last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
150. Fein, supra note 147.
151. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (Plaintiffs alleged that
defendants were liable for international human rights violations perpetrated by the Burmese
military in furtherance and for the benefit of the pipeline portion of the joint venture project.
Defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted due to plaintiffs
failure to prove that a violation of international law had occurred).
152. Joanne Mariner, Ashcroft's Justice, Burma's Crimes and Bork's Revenge (2003),
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20030526.html (last visited Dec.20, 2006).
153. USDOJ: About DOJ, http://www.usdoj.gov/02organizations/index.html (last visited
Dec.20, 2006).
154. Brief for the United States Supporting the Petition, at 9, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, et al.,
No. 03-339 (9th Cir. Sept. 2003).
155. Id.
156. Dhooge, supra note 81, at 83.
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themselves. 157 U.S. law enforcement agencies are already being criticized for
their use of excessive force in many cases. 158 Imagine what may come about if
countries are given the chance to try U.S. officials. 159 Once U.S. courts begin to
assert jurisdiction over cases by enforcing U.S. laws over sovereign
governments, other countries will begin to follow suit. 160 To illustrate this idea,
take into consideration the death penalty, which is legal in the U.S., but viewed
as an egregious act in most of the world.161 If a judge presiding over such a case
travels to a foreign country that asserts jurisdiction over human rights violations,
it is possible for a lawsuit to be filed against that judge by a family member of
the deceased seeking damages. 162 Such a scenario would endanger our public
officials, placing them at great risk.
163
2. Transnational Corporations
Those who oppose the A.T.C.A. contend that if the A.T.C.A. is left
unaltered, it would ultimately affect the way transnational corporations do
business, "creat[ing] enormous problems that, when added together, amount to
unilateral justice bordering on imperialism." 164 Moreover, the D.O.J. and the
Bush Administration fear the effects of the A.T.C.A., believing it has exceeded
its originally-intended reach. 165 The Administration feels its greatest threat is
the harmful effect of the A.T.C.A. potentially placing allies and foreign relations
at risk in the War on Terror, 166 thereby circumventing U.S. foreign policy.
167
Allies may also take offense to being implicated in human rights violations;
making them reluctant to participate with the U.S. in the War on Terror.
168
157. Thomas Niles, The Very Long Arm of American Law, USA ENGAGE, Nov. 5, 2002,
http://www.usaengage.org/news/2002/20021105_atcaniles.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
158. Debating the Tort Claims Act, supra note 139.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. HUFBAUER, supra note 104, at 46.
165. See Lorelle Londis, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old Statute
Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REv. 141 (2005).
166. Id.
167. Sheehan, supra note 105.
168. Terry Collingsworth, Worker Rights News, 7 INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FUND 2
(2004), available at http://www.laborrights.org/publications/WRN%20Fa1I04.pdf (last visited Dec.
20, 2006).
20061
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
3. Separation of Powers
Furthermore, A.T.C.A. lawsuits will result in a violation of the separation
of powers. 169 "The Constitution assigns to the political branches, not the courts,
responsibility for managing the nation's foreign" relations. 17  Thus, both the
Administration and the D.O.J. seek to not only provide immunity to
corporations, but also to narrow the scope of the A.T.C.A. by denying disputes
that have no connection whatsoever with the United States.' 7 1 Since 2003,
"plaintiffs using the [A.T.C.A.] have sued more than 50 multinational
corporations doing business in developing countries, alleging more than 200billion dollars in actual and punitive damages." 172 By adopting this view, critics
contend that the Administration is disregarding human rights worldwide. 173
B. A. T.C.A. Proponents
A.T.C.A. supporters believe that the Administration's contention-
increased litigation would constitute interference in foreign relations and the War
on Terror-bears no evidence and is unconvincing. 174 In order to lay a
foundation, it must first be established that foreign policy is multi-faceted, and
does not occur on just one level. 175  Having one strategy implemented on a176
human rights level does not preclude relations on other levels. Foreign
nations are aware of the U.S. system of separation of powers, which means that
cases decided by federal courts are not indicative of the U.S. government's
actions. 177
The A.T.C.A. has emerged as a critical law for the promotion of human
rights in U.S. courts, 178 defining a common goal of justice and relief to victims
of human rights violators around the world. 179 Furthermore, no evidence has
169. Marcia Coyle, Justices Weigh Alien Tort Act, THE NAT'L L.J., Mar. 29, 2004,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1080334938936 (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
170. Id.
171. Katrin Dauenhauer, Experts Defend Law from Business Attack, IPS, July 29, 2003,
http://domino.ips.org/ips%5Ceng.nsf/vwWebMainView/675AD4EDEAC517F9C 1256D72007B45
2D/?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See Dhooge, supra note 81.
175. Responses to ATCA, supra note 114, at 4.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Fuks, supra note 145, at 117.
179. Human Rights First, The Alien Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act:
Important Tools in the Fight Against Impunity,
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/intemational-justice/w-context/w-cont_12.htm (last visited on
Dec. 20, 2006) (Human Rights First is a non-profit organization designed to promote security and
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been presented supporting the argument that the continuation of litigation against
transnational corporations will have catastrophic effects on U.S. foreign policy,
arising as a result of the A.T.C.A. 180  Most importantly, federal judges have
repeatedly demonstrated their capability of analyzing these claims under the
relevant statute to determine whether the strict standards required to proceed
have been sufficiently met. 181 Moreover, judges have not hesitated to dismiss
cases at an early stage, where plaintiffs did not meet their high burden of
proof 1
82
Statistically, more than twenty A.T.C.A. cases have been filed against
private corporations since 1993; however, such a fierce attack on the A.T.C.A.
by the Administration is uncalled for since none of the cases have been heard on
the merits, much less "resulted in a final judgment against a U.S. company."' 183
Up until 2003, all cases filed against corporations operating overseas have been
dismissed due to deficiencies in the claims. 184  U.S. courts are capable of
dismissing frivolous cases.1 85 Also, transnational corporations facing A.T.C.A.
lawsuits will only be held liable for involvement as principals or accomplices in
abusive environments. 186 In contrast, when such crimes occur within the United
States, corporate perpetrators are held liable for their involvement in illegal
conspiracies under either criminal law or civil law. 187  With that in mind,
transnational corporations in violation of international law should be held
equally liable.1
88
"Allowing the rule of law to govern knowing violations of human rights by
multinational firms is an important first step in establishing a global economy
based on the values of those companies, and all civilized societies, claim to
support in principle."' 189 Advancement of the human rights rhetoric in the War
on Terror could be reached with the U.S. government enforcing laws designed to
humane treatment by advancing justice, human dignity, and respect for the law in the United States
and the world) [hereinafter Human Rights First].
180. Dhooge, supra note 81, at 80.
181. Human Rights First, supra note 179.
182. Id.
183. Koh, supra note 133.
184. Abdallah Simaika, The Value of Information: Alternatives to Liability in Influencing
Corporate Behavior Overseas, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 321,323 (2005).
185. Koh, supra note 133.
186. Ruben J. Garcia, Transnationalism as a Social Movement Strategy: Institutions, Actors and
International Labor Standards, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 9 (2003).
187. No Safe Haven, The Attack on ATCA, http://www.nosafehaven.org/attack.html (last visited
Dec. 20, 2006).
188. Id.
189. Terry Collingsworth, Separating Fact From Fiction in the Debate Over Application of The
Alien Tort Claims Act to Violations of Fundamental Human Rights by Corporations, 37 U.S.F. L.
REV. 563,578 (2003).
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protect innocent victims and survivors. 190  Supporters believe utilizing the
A.T.C.A. to put an end to human rights violations is actually a necessary element
to the War on Terror.19 1 Allowing U.S. corporations to act with immunity sends
the wrong message to our allies in the War on Terror. 1
92
1. The Torture Victim Protection Act and the Alien Tort Claims Act
The Torture Victim Protection Act (T.V.P.A.) was enacted as a legislative
response to a concurring opinion in an early A.T.C.A. case challenging the use
of the A.T.C.A. in human rights litigation. 193  The legislative history of the
T.V.P.A. indicates that Congress essentially sought to reaffirm the line of cases
inaugurated by Filartiga in the face of judicial resistance. 194  The T.V.P.A.
allows both U.S. citizens and aliens to bring suit against a person who subjects
an individual to torture or extrajudicial killing. 19 5  For example, potential
plaintiffs include victims who have suffered repeated torture for their mere
involvement in assisting their community. 196 Community assistance
encompasses "providing healthcare or religious counseling to the poor,"
encouraging literacy, and failing to follow the orders of security forces.
197
However, the T.V.P.A. is in a way more restricted than the A.T.C.A. 19 8 The
T.V.P.A. only permits suits to be brought under two violations of international
law (torture and/or extrajudicial killing), requires the plaintiff to exhaust local
remedies, and the defendant must to act under the authority or law of a foreign
nation. 
199
Congress' objective in passing the T.V.P.A. was to promote and protect
human rights-an objective consistent with the other objectives found in the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Such an achievement by Congress not only
reinforces the A.T.C.A., but also puts a stamp of approval on judicial remedy for
190. See id.
191. Dauenhauer, supra note 171.
192. See id.
193. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
194. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, H. R. REP. No. 102-367 pt 1, at 3 (1991); The
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, S. REP. No. 102-249, at 3-4, 5 (1991) (becoming public law
102-256).
195. Ratner, supra note 89, at 3.
196. Human Rights First, supra note 179.
197. Id.
198. Ratner, supra note 89.
199. See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)).
200. Human Rights First, supra note 179.
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some of these most heinous acts.20 1 Attacking the A.T.C.A. "through judicial
interpretation or congressional repeal offer[s] a non-solution to a non-
problem... [by not only] underestimating the ability of the courts to derail
abusive or frivolous lawsuits, [but also by] underestimating the value of the
A.T.C.A. in assuring that the United States does not become a safe haven for
abusers."' 202  When taking into consideration the objectives in enacting the
T.V.P.A. pursuant to the A.T.C.A., the repeal of either one of these acts could
prove disastrous. °3 If repealed, lawsuits such as those filed by 9/11 victims
against Saudi banks and institutions for their involvement in the terrorist attacks
would be prohibited.204 Elimination of the act would grant full immunity to all
human rights abusers for any act, so long as the act was committed outside of the
U.S. 205  Subsequently, the efforts of the War on Terror would potentially be
hampered by essentially granting immunity to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda
and state sponsors of terrorism.
C. Proponents of Executive Order 13303
The United States and its private contractors who have undertaken Iraqi
reconstruction projects may have exposed themselves to an onslaught of
lawsuits.20 7 This explains why many companies are not making a commitment
to the Iraqi reconstruction, for fear that attorneys pursuing human rights violators
stand ready to invoke the A.T.C.A. °8  In fact, the possibility of lawsuits
claiming millions of dollars in damages posed an inherent risk in taking on the
reconstruction project. 209  Businesses such as energy, transportation, and
construction have taken a step back to re-think their decisions to assist in the
revival of post-war Iraq in light of A.T.C.A. pending cases. Moreover, this
201. Id.
202. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Theoretical and Historical Foundations of
the Alien Tort Claims Act and its Discontents: A Reality Check, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 585, 605
(2004).
203. Koh, supra note 133.
204. No Safe Haven, supra note 187.
205. Koh, supra note 133.
206. Id.
207. George C. Wilson, Operation Iraqi Lawsuit, Govexec.com, Nov. 3, 2003,
http://www.govexec.com/story-page.cfm?articleid=26983&printerffriend]yVers=l& (last visited
Dec. 20, 2006).
208. Paul Rosenzweig, Trial Lawyers Could Stymie Rebuilding of Iraq, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, Apr. 18, 2004, available at
http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed062003b.cfm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
209. Wilson, supra note 207.
210. Rosenzweig, supra note 208.
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decision is based on the lack of congressional action in controlling A.T.C.A.
claims.
2 11
The U.S. Treasury Department maintains that the sole purpose behind
issuing E.O. 13303 is to protect the profits derived from Iraqi oil by ensuring
that they are placed into a Development Fund, specifically intended to assist in
the reconstruction of Iraq.2 12 This Development Fund, created by E.O. 13303,
protects the profits from being legally attached or claimed before Iraqi citizens
have an opportunity to claim these profits for themselves. 2 13  Moreover,
transnational corporations such as the oil companies that risk entering the
country may feel more comfortable knowing there is some level of protection in
the federal court. 2 14  A legal research scholar, Paul Rosenzweig, from the
Heritage Foundation said, "the United States is for now the sovereign
government of Iraq and, as such, could not be sued in U.S. federal court.
' zl5
However, one legal professor "cautioned... 'it should not be assumed by
anyone in the oil industry that orders of this character can immunize either the
federal government or oil companies from the full force of occupation law."'
216
It seems unlikely that the federal government would accept E.O. 13303 over
occupation law, considering the fact that the latter has statutory force.
2 17
D. Executive Order 13303 Opponents
Previously unnoticed, E.O. 13303 is now under heavy scrutiny by human
rights groups for fear that corporate accountability is being limited for those218
conducting business in Iraq. The belief is that the Administration may have
had a motive in issuing the E.O. 13303--ending the recent rise in A.T.C.A. suits
for fear that to-be injured Iraqis will utilize the A.T.C.A. against transnational
corporations' for their presence in Iraq.19 Not only does E.O. 13303 prevent
A.T.C.A. suits by Iraqi citizens, but it also goes as far as preventing tort suits by
American citizens who have been asked by the government or their employer to
assist in the Iraq reconstruction process. 22 Is E.O. 13303 essentially the tort
reform corporations with international transactions have been looking for?
Translated from legalese, E.O. 13303 "cancels the concept of corporate
accountability and abandons the rule of law" in three broad areas which will be
211. Id.
212. Wilson, supra note 207.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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discussed: (1) an unrestrained scope of immunity, (2) lack of foundation in
international law, and (3) its scope of legal consequences.221
1. Unrestrained Scope of Immunity
To begin with, there is no restraint on immunity. Section 1 of the Executive
Order clearly states that any judicial process is null and void, thereby removing
all enforcement for civil and criminal liability with respect to the entities
protected under the Order. 22  Furthermore, all corporate activities containing
roots or having any connection whatsoever with Iraqi oil is protected. 23  The
scope can be further expanded by taking into consideration the mixing of Iraqi
oil with domestic products for a variety of commercial transactions."
224
2. Lack of Foundation
Arguably, the Order could have arisen from the President's inherent power
to enter into executive agreements or implement foreign policy; however, this
rationale falls short.225  When taking into consideration the Order, "[t]he
President did not enter into an agreement with a foreign sovereign as the
Executive did in Dames & Moore."'2 26 When the Order was issued, Iraq was
controlled by the U.S.227  "[T]he Order does not merely implement U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1483," as it differs significantly by crossing the
boundaries of international law.228 Unlike Resolution 1483 that "grants limited
immunity for oil related reconstruction activities," E.O. 13303 provides a "blank
221. See Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
222. See Exec. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 228 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86
(2000).
223. 3 C.F.R. 228, reprinted in § 1701, at 86.
224. Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
225. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
226. Kelly, supra note 24, at 508; see, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)
(Contrasting the view that the outcome may have been different had the Order established a
mechanism by which future claims were to be heard by a tribunal associated with the Development
Fund of Iraq. That way, money would not be spent on litigation expenses; however, no such
tribunal was established.); id. at 417 (Holding that "a California statute [requiring] insurance
companies doing business in the state to disclose information about their Holocaust era activities
interfered with the President's power to conduct foreign relations. The President had entered into
an agreement with Germany to establish a compensation fund to settle Holocaust error claims" and
concluded that "the President had the power to settle claims of its nationals against private
companies through negotiations with other states.").
227. David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, 858 (2003) (noting that
"[t]here is no 'sovereign authority' in Iraq during the period of foreign occupation by the United
States and United Kingdom.")
228. Kelly, supra note 24, at 508.
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check" for transnational corporations to profit.229  In contrast, the Security
Council grants limited immunity, but three limitations sustain liability. 23 First,
Resolution 1483 protects only until title ,asses to the initial purchaser or in this
case until the oil is sold for the first time. Second, one can sustain liability for
any misconduct beyond privileges and immunities enjoyed by the United
Nations. 232 Third, for "any legal proceeding in which recourse to such proceeds
or obligations is necessary to satisfy liability for damages assessed in connection
with an ecological accident... that occurs after the date of adoption of this
resolution."
233
3. Scope of Legal Consequences
Lastly, E.O. 13303 has overstepped its boundaries in connection with the
scope of legal consequences. 234  Under the terms defined by E.O. 13303,
accountability for all crimes committed abroad would be erased, including
violations of Iraqi civil law, international treaties, and contractual terms with
various entities or U.S. laws such as the A.T.C.A.2 35 Furthermore, civil and
criminal liability would also be eliminated domestically. 236  Examples of
liability against which corporations are protected include: job related injuries due
to safety violations, employment laws including child labor and equal
opportunity, and consumer fraud.237  David Rivkin, a lawyer for the Bush
Administration, has argued that the international rules state nothing in regard to
imposing strict liability where one's actions do not provide a proper result.
238
However, he did acknowledge the fact that had the U.S. occupied Iraq with the
blessing of the U.N., it would have been less vulnerable to the onslaught of
lawsuits. 2 39 The breadth of the Executive Order also goes as far as abrogating
any possibility of holding international financial institutions liable by
exonerating them from enforcement of any appropriations or other congressional
checks and balances for U.S. financed spending. 24  David Scheffer,
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues during President Clinton's second
term, contends, "[we] have gone far beyond just patching up Iraq ... and are
229. Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
230. Id.
231. G.A. Res. 1483, 1 22, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Wilson, supra note 207.
239. Id.
240. Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
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now moving onto the forbidden ground of exploiting the oil wealth of the
country."
24 1
V. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT: THE VALIDITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13303
Historically, Executive Orders have been issued by Presidents and
executive agencies, both of whom utilize the United States Code to justify their
actions.24 2  Another statute utilized by Presidents facing both unusual and
extraordinary threats is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1701. 2 43  IEEPA grants the President the
authority to act on any authority granted under section 1702 of this title to deal
with "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy,
or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency
with respect to the threat."'244 With such broad powers granted to the executive
branch, it is as if the President is "running the country" by temporarily holding
legislative power.245
A. Carter & Reagan Administration Orders under Heavy Scrutiny
Executive Orders have historically maintained their validity when
challenged.246 In response to Iranian militants seizing the American Embassy in
Tehran, Iran,247 President Carter issued a national emergency and invoked
IEEPA, thereby blocking the removal of all Iranian property subject to U.S.
. .. . 248
jurisdiction. Upon issuing this order, which "blocked all property and
interests in property of the Government of Iran,",249 the Treasury Department
restricted judicial process with respect to any foreign interest in property. 25
0
Following Carter's presidency, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12294,
which ratified President Carter's orders and was aimed at suspending the
enforcement of all claims presented to the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal.
251
241. Wilson, supra note 207.
242. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
243. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2005).
244. § 1701(a).
245. See § 1701.
246. See Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
247. American Experience, People & Events: The Iranian Hostage Crisis, November 1979 -
January 1981, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/peopleevents/e-hostage.html (last
visited Dec. 20, 2006).
248. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
249. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979).
250. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
251. Id.
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Specifically, the order issued by President Reagan stated "such claims shall have
no legal effect in any action now pending in the United States."
252
1. Developing the Analytic Framework
In the matter of Dames & Moore v. Regan, the plaintiff's basis for
challenging the claims relied on the belief that the orders conferred by the
President were outside the scope of his power, and that these orders violated the
doctrine of separation of powers by divesting the courts of jurisdiction. 25 3 The
Supreme Court subsequently determined that IEEPA constituted a specific
congressional authorization for the President's order to transfer Iranian assets to
the Federal Reserve. 254 The basis for the Court's reasoning was found in the
purpose of JEEPA itself, which was "to put control of foreign assets in the hands
of the President."'25 5 IEEPA permits the President to use foreign assets as a tool•256
when negotiating national emergencies. In this case, since the Order was
issued to prohibit the transfer of Iranian assets for the President to use as a
bargaining chip, the order fell within the guidelines of IEEPA, and was thus
found constitutional.
2 5 7
With regard to President Reagan's order, the Court found insufficient
statutory authority; 25 8 however, it determined that both the facts of the case and
the applicable statutes, Congress implicitly authorized presidential control of
claim settlement. 259 Moreover, the Court upheld the orders of both Presidents
based on Congressional intent. 26 Prior cases recognized that the President does
have some power to act independently of Congress, 261 as demonstrated by the
longstanding practice in the area of claim settlement by executive agreement.
262
Based on the foregoing reasons, the actions of President Carter and
President Reagan were upheld. 263 Regarding the power to settle claims against
foreign governments "where... the settlement of the claims has been
determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy
252. Exec. Order 12,294, 3 C.F.R. 139 (1981).
253. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981).
254. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
255. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673.
256. Kelly, supra note 24, at 498.
257. Id. at 499.
258. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
259. The OYEZ project, Dame & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981),
http://www.oyez.org/cases/case/?case=1980-1989/1980/1980 80_2078 (last visited Dec. 28,
2006).
260. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
261. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682. (1981).
262. Id.
263. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
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dispute between our country and another, and where... [the Court] can
conclude that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, [the Court was] not
prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such claims."'264 In
fact, the Court found that the order did not modify federal jurisdiction; rather, the
order merely effectuated a change in the substantive law.
265
Thus, Dames & Moore v. Regan provides a two-steps-analysis to determine
whether President Bush has overstepped his boundaries by issuing E.O.
13303.266 The first step requires an analysis of whether Congress has in fact
authorized the Order. 2 6 - Second, it must be determined whether Congress had
implicitly granted authority or the President had inherent authority with respect
to the Executive's action. 68 Moreover, even if the President had the proper
authority to issue such an order under the above analysis it must still be
considered whether the order modifies or withdraws jurisdiction. 269 With such a
narrow decision, the question still remains as to the extent of the President's
power with respect to claims settlement. 27 With the framework devised by the
Supreme Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan, would the same result arise should
Executive Order 13303 be challenged for review?
B. Applying the Framework to Executive Order 13303
Executive Order 13303 issued by President Bush invokes not only the
IEEPA, but also the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.),
section five of the United Nations Participation Act (22 U.S.C. § 287c) (UNPA),
and 3 U.S.C. § 301. 27 1 To determine the validity of the E.O., the Dames &
Moore framework must be applied. 272 It seems unlikely that President Bush had
Congressional authority to issue EO 13303. 273  By invoking IEEPA, the
President is essentially providing himself a bargaining chip by blocking the
transfer of property in cases of extraordinary threats to national security, foreign
policy or the economy. 274 However, the language of E.O. 13303 leads some to
believe that the E.O. is being used to block the transfer of property through only
264. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 688.
265. Kelly, supra note 24, at 501.
266. Id. at 502.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Memorandum from EarthRights Int'l to Interested Persons, Legal Issues associated with
Executive Order 13303, at 3 (Sept. 19, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter EarthRights
Memorandum].
271. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 227-29 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86-87 (2000).
272. Kelly, supra note 24, at 502.
273. Id.
274. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2005).
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the judicial process, instead of blocking the voluntary transfer of property as was
done by President Carter.
275
Executive Order 13303 is different in the sense that it does not operate to
protect the money so that it can be used as a bargaining chip by the President.
276
Rather, it builds a protective barrier for the money to exchange hands between
private parties without the possibility of judicial interference. 7 This method of
protection is effectively protecting profits arising from Iraqi oil and not
necessarily from the Development Fund, as stated by the President. 278 The order
does not prevent corporations from moving money or paying dividends to its
shareholders out of the profits.279 The only things blocked are the attempts by
injured parties to satisfy judgments by attaching oil, oil proceeds, and property
arising from or relating to oil or oil proceeds. 28 Based on the initial step of the
Dames & Moore analysis, the President most likely lacked the authority to issue
Executive Order 13303 under the IEEPA. 28 1 The next step in the Dames &
Moore analysis requires a determination of whether the President has the
inherent authority or implicit consent of Congress to justify the Executive
Order. 2
82
Arguably, the Executive Order is beyond any inherent Presidential authority
or implied Congressional consent.283 Not only does the order immunize private
companies from lawsuits, it goes even further by failing to provide an alternate
forum for claims against those private companies involved in the reconstruction
project. 284 In Dames & Moore, the Court believed the order was issued in an
attempt to only suspend the claims and not in an attempt by the Administration285
to completely divest the federal courts of jurisdiction. The Executive Order at
issue in Dames & Moore allowed those claims outside the jurisdiction of the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to later be revived and brought to U.S. courts where
they would be judicially enforceable. 28 6 Thus, the President had done nothing,
but show the exercise of his power acquiesced by Congress, to settle claims.2 87
275. Kelly, supra note 24, at 503.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id..
280. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 227-29 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86-87 (2000).
281. Kelly, supra note 24, at 502-503.
282. Id. at 504.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 685.
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However, President Bush's order does in fact arguably divest the court of federal
jurisdiction for two reasons. 288
1. Divesting the Courts of Jurisdiction
Executive Order 13303 is similar to President Reagan's order in that it
places a freeze on the transfer of Iraqi property.289 But E.O. 13303 can be
distinguished in that it goes even further by including products "that are or
hereafter come within the possession or control of United States persons. ' 29° By
definition, United States persons include "any United States citizen, permanent
resident alien," entities established under United States law or any person in the
United States.29 1 With such an overreaching definition of United States persons,
E.O. 13303 can be interpreted as protecting any product or interest that comes
into the possession or control of this group. If a court is prohibited from
hearing a case against a United States person, then it is arguably divested of its
jurisdiction over the defendant. 293 However, recall "that the President's power
to settle or dismiss claims of U.S. citizens ... is limited," as held by the
Supreme Court.2 9 4  But, since the Supreme Court has only addressed claims
against foreign governments and has yet to address cases involving claims
against private entities, the outcome of a challenge against E.O. 13303 is
unclear. 95
2. Extinguishing the Claims and the Lack of an Alternative Forum
Another factor distinguishing President Bush's Executive Order from
President Reagan's order is that President Bush seeks to nullify296 "any
attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment, or other judicial
process . . . . 297 In a system designed to always provide a forum of relief for the
injured party, the claimant in this case is left with no alternative forum to seek
relief of his or her damages. 298 Arguably, the inability of an injured plaintiff to
bring forward his suit is essentially a waiver of claims without compensation.
29 9
If one assumes the claims constitute property as defined in the Fifth
288. See Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
289. Id.
290. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 227-29 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86-87 (2000).
291. 3 C.F.R. 228, reprinted in § 1701, at 86.
292. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
293. Id.
294. EarthRights Memorandum, supra note 270.
295. Id.
296. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
297. Order No. 13,303, 3 C.F.R. 227-29 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1701, at 86-87 (2000).
298. See Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
299. EarthRights Memorandum, supra note 270, at 7.
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Amendment, then this is perhaps a taking in violation of the Due Process clause
provided by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 300 The
proper analysis required for this issue would be outside the scope of this paper
and will not be further analyzed.
C. The Result of the A.T.C.A. & E.O. 13303
The battle over tort victims' right to sue leads some to believe that the E.O.
sets bad precedent for an abuse of Executive power over private litigation in the
context of national security. 30 1 Furthermore, the analysis of E.O. 13303 leads
one to categorize the order under the penchant, "sneaky tort reform. ' 3°2 As
mentioned earlier, the issue of E.O. 13303 may have come as a result of the fear
that private companies operating in Iraq may be sued by foreign citizens303
invoking the A.T.C.A. Not only are foreign citizens affected by the E.O.,
ordinary U.S. citizens who may be grievously injured by working in Iraq to
rebuild the country may also be kept from bringing an ordinary tort action.304
However, although judgments may have been successful, recovery in monetary
• 305 ...
terms has been minimal. So, why is the Bush Administration preventing its
American citizens from bringing tort actions against the private companies
operating in Iraq who may be found liable for human rights violations?30 6 One
theory is that the Bush Administration is implementing the Executive Order as a
tax break for corporations involved in Iraq.307 However, the tort victims-
among others-are the only individuals supplying the funds for the
reconstruction process rather than all taxpayers in general. 308 It seems unfair to
hold accident victims accountable and responsible for the financial burden, when
the money recovered could be put towards medical treatment, rehabilitation, and
other needs. 309 Although unrecognized by this theory, self-help through the
court system for both U.S. citizens and aliens should remain an integral part of
our democratic tradition.
310
300. Id.
301. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Elizabeth F. Defeis, Litigating Human Rights Abuses in United States Courts: Recent
Developments, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 319 (2004).
306. Sebok and Kelly, supra note 7.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Weiss, supra note 108.
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VI. SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN: THE MOST RECENT DECISION
AFFECTING THE A.T.C.A. AND ITS EFFECT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13303
In a 2004 decision, the Supreme Court attempted to partially resolve the
widely debated issue over what claims are actionable under the A.T.C.A., and
whether those claims are violations of the law of nations. 311 Oddly enough,
"[b]oth human rights supporters and corporate lobbying organizations...
applauded the decision."3  However, in answering the long awaited question,
the Court avoided many difficult questions that have made the A.T.C.A. one of
the most controversial topics in the past ten years. 3 13 Thus, we are still left with
the question of whether the A.T.C.A. will be as powerful a threat as human
rights activists had hoped for.314  Although the Sosa decision has provided
human rights supporters with a sense of victory, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-
Machain's suit seeking damages for arbitrary arrest was not a personal
victory.315 The Supreme Court held even that if his detention was illegal, lasting
"less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a
prompt arraignment, violate[d] no norm of customary international law." 316
A. The Facts of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The legal predicament arose as a result of a federal grand jury indictment of
Alvarez for his role in the torture and murder of a Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) agent.317 The incident took place in 1985 in Mexico, where a Mexican
drug cartel tortured and murdered an American DEA agent.3 18 It was believed
that the defendant was involved in keeping the agent alive for the purpose of
getting more information or prolonging his agony.3 19 The U.S. issued an arrest
warrant for Alvarez due to his alleged involvement in the torture, but the
Mexican government would not agree to turn him over to the DEA. 32 However,
Alvarez was captured in Mexico by the DEA and Mexican nationals, including
311. Scott, supra note 140, at 1508-09.
312. Jacqueline Koch, Not in Their Backyard, CorpWatch (July 18, 2004),
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=l 1441 (last visited Dec. 19, 2006).
313. Anthony J. Sebok, Is the Alien Tort Claims Act a Powerful Human Rights Tool?, CNN, July
12, 2004, available at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/12/sebok.alien.tort.claims/ (last Dec.
20, 2006).
314. Id.
315. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
316. Id. at 738.
317. Id. at 697.
318. Sebok, supra note 313.
319. Id.
320. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Francisco Sosa. Alvarez was transported to the United States to stand trial for
the murder of a DEA agent;322 however, Alvarez was ultimately acquitted upon
the district courts granting a motion for acquittal. 32 3  Subsequently, Alvarez
brought a civil action 324 alleging a violation of the law of nations under the
A.T.C.A.3 25  Ultimately, the Supreme Court denied Alvarez relief under the
A.T.C.A., and most importantly denied the Court's interpretation in Sosa,
leaving the statute open to be utilized for the recognition of other claims.
3 26
B. Supreme Courts Analysis: The A. T. C.A. Applied to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain case boiled down to a jurisdictional issue,
which left the Court to determine whether the arrest and transport of Alvarez-
Machain was truly a violation of the law of nations. 327 If the A.T.C.A. were
purely jurisdictional, as argued by the Bush Administration and corporate
lobbyists, it would not allow plaintiffs to bring human rights cases. 328 However,
if the statute itself provides authority for federal courts to hear these cases, then
the argument is moot.
32 9
Upon reviewing the legislative history of the A.T.C.A., the Court was able
to determine that when Congress enacted the A.T.C.A. as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, it "gave the district courts 'cognizance' of certain causes of action"
in terms of "a grant in jurisdiction, not power to mold substantive law." 330 Thus,
although the statute is jurisdictional, it only grants courts the authority to hear a
narrow class of claims.33 1 The Court further sums up by stating that "the statute
was intended as jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts
to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject. ' 332 This is also demonstrated
by the placement of the A.T.C.A. in the Judiciary Act in section 9, a statute
exclusively concerned with the jurisdiction of federal courts. 3 33
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
324. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 2003).
325. Id. at 608.
326. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.
327. Id. at 712-14.
328. See Press Release, Covington & Burling, Second Circuit Victory for Client in Alien Tort
Claims Act Case, (Sept. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.cov.com/download/pressrelease/oid29166/030903A.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
329. Id.
330. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
331. Borchien Lai, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Temporary Stopgap Measure or Permanent
Remedy?, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 139, 150 (2005).
332. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714.
333. Id.
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The A.T.C.A., being held as a jurisdictional statute, raises a question about
the interaction between A.T.C.A. suits at the time of enactment and the ambient
law of the era.334 Sosa argued that no claim for relief would be available without
a statute validating the cause of action. 335  However, legal history has
demonstrated that once a jurisdictional grant was on the books, federal courts
could entertain claims because specific international law violations would have
• 336
been recognized. The Sosa decision concluded that the A.T.C.A. has been
jurisdictional since its inception, providing courts the power to entertain cases
concerned with violations of the law of nations.
337
C. A Crack in the Door, But Not Wide Open
The Sosa decision assuaged corporations that the A.T.C.A. would not be
unleashed to allow thousands of claims leading to disruption of the world
economy.33 8 Corporations also felt some sense of safety by the Supreme Court
noting that only a "very limited category" of cases is actionable under an
A.T.C.A. claim.3 39 The Court emphasized the restricted nature of the class of
possible claims throughout the opinion by stating the following terms: "cases
concerned with a subject," "a relatively modest set of actions," "only a very
limited set of claims," "a narrow set of common law actions derive from the law
of nations," and "the modest number of international law violations with a
potential for personal liability.
' 34°
To properly ascertain which A.T.C.A. cases are actionable, the Court
looked back in time to the inception of the A.T.C.A. 34 1 When enacted in 1789,
the common law only provided a cause of action for a limited set of international
violations, which included piracy, the right to safe conduct, and the rights of
ambassadors. 342 Until today, these crimes have served as the model as to which
violations are actionable. To define what types of actions are currently included
in the 'very limited category' of cases, the Court determined that the case must
be definable, universal and obligatory. 343 To determine whether an international
norm meets these standards, it is required that: 1) no state condone the act; 2)
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Fuks, supra note 145, at 121.
338. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
339. Id. at712.
340. Id. at 720-21, 724.
341. Id. at 725.
342. Id. at 694.
343. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, In re estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779-80 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring),
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there be a "universal" consensus in prohibiting the act; 3) there be a concrete
criteria for a court to determine whether an international norm is violated; and 4)
the prohibition be indispensable and binding at all times. 344 In Alvarez, the
Court found the allegation to be too broad to rise to the level of an international
law violation, and thus reversed the case.345 The restricted nature of the possible
A.T.C.A. claims is repeatedly emphasized throughout the Sosa opinion, further
assuring control over future A.T.C.A. claims.
346
D. Sosa. The War on Terror
Although the Supreme Court does not explicitly mention the War on Terror,
it does address the potential impact of A.T.C.A. on foreign affairs. 347 The Court
enters into a lengthy analysis of how extra judicial caution should be taken when
hearing new claims under the A.T.C.A.34 8 The Court also discussed the dangers
of judicial interference with the foreign policy branches of government,
especially between the legislative and executive branches. 349 In one instance,
the Court stated, "a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to
legislative judgment in the great majority of cases." 350
When determining whether a violation of international law may be invoked
by the A.T.C.A., the Court recommends the consideration of "the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal courts."
351
Where there is fear of a negative foreign policy impact, it is suggested that
federal courts place serious emphasis on that opinion. 35 The Sosa Court further
states that deference to political branches should be determined independently on
a case-by-case basis. With the Sosa decision, the restrictive nature of the
A.T.C.A. is apparent, and it is now clear that the A.T.C.A. does not provide a
license for plaintiffs to sue. 354  The restricted nature of the A.T.C.A. is
demonstrated by the Supreme Court in Sosa, which required a specific,
universal, and obligatory claim while deference was given to political branches
on foreign policy matters.
3 55
344. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995).
345. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. Id. at 725.
349. Id. at 725-28.
350. Id. at 727.
351. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004).
352. Id. at 727.
353. Id. at 732.
354. See id. at 733.
355. See id.
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However, keeping in mind the restrictive nature of the A.T.C.A., the Ninth
Circuit noted that "[i]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches upon foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.",356 Although
adjudication of such claims may have harmful effects on foreign policy, they do
not exceed statutory enforcement and judicial review. 357
VII. CONCLUSION
This comment provides an analysis of both Executive Order 13303 and the
Alien Tort Claims Act, considering (i) whether the Bush Administration's
issuance of the Executive Order is an attempt to repeal the Alien Tort Claims
Act, (ii) whether the order was issued as an attempt to bar lawsuits against
private companies, (iii) whether the President had the authority to issue such
order, (iv) and whether the order resulted in a withdrawal or modification of
federal jurisdiction. At first blush, Executive Order 13303 seems to be an
attempt by the Administration to repeal the A.T.C.A. The Administration
appears to be preventing corporations from being involved in lawsuits arising
from alleged human rights violations taking place overseas, including in Iraq.
35A
The Administration issued E.O. 13303 despite Dames & Moore, which provided
courts with the criteria necessary to evaluate the constitutionality of an Executive
Order.
3 59
The effect and scope of the order raises some concerns in regards to its
implications. Granting presidential power to change the law without providing
an alternative forum could not only create bad precedent, but also works against
traditional democratic principles. E.O. 13303 is different than Dames &
Moore, where the Court upheld the order based on the President's long-
recognized power to settle claims with foreign governments. 36 1 E.O. 13303 is
essentially a silent grant of presidential power which appears to protect private
entities.
362
Fears that the federal courts would unleash the A.T.C.A. against
transnational corporations have not been realized. 363 Courts remain fully aware
356. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 614 n.7 (9th Cir. 2003).
357. Dhooge, supra note 81, at 82.
358. See Government Accountability Project, supra note 32.
359. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
360. Kelly, supra note 24, at 485.
361. See EarthRights International, Executive Order 13303: Instituting Immunity?, Aug. 13,
2003,
http://www.earthrights.org/campaignfeature/executive-order 13303_instituting-immunity.html
(last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
362. Kelly, supra note 24, at 516.
363. Human Rights First, supra note 85.
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of the potential consequences of their rulings against both the injured plaintiff
and the transnational corporation involved. However, these rulings affect not
only the parties in an A.T.C.A. lawsuit, but also governments. 365 Courts are
aware of the express language of the statute, and their opinions recognize that
not every violation of international law is a tort for purposes of the A.T.C.A. As
set forth, the A.T.C.A. may properly be utilized by the plaintiff when the alleged
1 36 6violation achieved specific, universal, and obligatory status. 36
364. Dhooge, supra note 81, at 101.
365. Id.
366. Id.
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